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I. Introduction
Until the sudden financial crisis and the subsequent International Monetary Fund (IMF)
bailout loan in late 1997, Korea's economy had been referred to as a good example of Asian
economic miracles. Many economists studied the Korean economy to introduce a desirable
model for other developing countries' economic development. In this regard, the role of
law in Korean economic development drew considerable attention from academic and pol-
icy circles. A few years ago, the author, as a country team leader, participated in a collab-
orative research project entitled "The Role of Law and Legal Institutions in Asian Eco-
nomic Development (1960-95)," sponsored by the Asian Development Bank.' A part of the
author's collaborative work analyzed whether law and legal institutions had a positive impact
on economic development in Korea.2 The above project obviously considered the Asian
"miracles," but not the recent Asian "crisis." Accordingly, the author's collaborative work
did not analyze the role of law issue covering the period following the Korean financial
crisis.
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, Korea has undertaken a series of economic
reforms, and its economy is now in the process of recovery. This article examines whether
*Seung Wha Chang (LL.M., 1992, and SJ.D., 1994, Harvard Law School; LL.B., 1985 and LL.M., 1991,
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symposium, "The International Comparative Legal Systems: Law as a Mechanism for Economic Dispute
Resolution," sponsored by The Tokyo Foundation. This paper benefits from comments by Konsik Kim and
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1. For the final comparative report, see KATHARINA PISTOn & PHILIP A. WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW AND
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT 1960-1995 (1998).
2. For the Korean team report, see SEUNG WHA CHANG & KWANG SHIK SHIN, THE ROLE OF LAW AND
LEGAL INSTITUTIONs IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF KOREA (HUD Development Discussion
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and to what extent law has played a role not only in Korea's economic development process
(1960-1996), but also in the subsequent economic adjustment process (1997-1999), in-
cluding the reforms being made in conjunction with conditionalities of the IMF bailout
package and the World Bank's structural adjustment loans (SAL). In addition, this article
points out the current economic reform's inherent limits that, in the author's view, result
from the failure in establishing the "rule of law" in the judicial/administrative/legislative
system of Korea. Then, this article concludes with some policy suggestions for fundamental
legal reforms to realize the "rule-oriented society" in Korea.
H. The Role of Law and Legal Institutions in Korea's
Economic Development: 1960-19951
A. THE ROLE OF SUBSTANTIVE LAWS IN KOREA's ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
In terms of substantive economic laws, it would appear that there has been a high degree
of interaction between the law and economic development in Korea. In particular, the
Korean government intentionally utilized legislation in achieving its goals of economic
development. The question of whether the legislative activities had a positive impact on
economic development seems to depend on the subject of the law and the particular time
period of Korea's development process. In certain time periods, the law appeared to have
a positive impact on economic development, while in others, the law produced mere side-
effects. 4 Thus, notwithstanding the high level of interaction between the law and economic
development, it is not easy to draw a general conclusion as to the direction and nature of
the influence of the legislative activity on the economy. This section briefly describes in-
terplays between legislative activity and economic development in Korea for the last several
decades, preceding the recent financial crisis.
In the 1950s, immediately after the Korean War, Korea did not witness considerable
economic growth.' Nor were there well-established legal and institutional arrangements
necessary for the government to pursue an active development strategy. The systematic
legal infrastructure had not been established. Of course, Korea had its Constitution 6 and
individual laws, such as the basic intellectual property laws and labor laws7 that were in
existence in the 1950s, but these laws were not enforced and, thus, were virtually meaning-
less. The institutions necessary to enforce the laws were not formally in place at that time.'
Under these circumstances, it was inconceivable to derive an industrial policy that would
prepare for the future restructuring of industries. In that sense, the law was virtually irrel-
evant to the economy, and vice versa. Moreover, it is difficult to relate legal change to
economic change during this period, either positively or negatively, as there was no signifi-
3. This part derives mainly from id.
4. See id. at 1-5, 11-33.
5. For the economic conditions of Korea in the 1950s, see, e.g., id. at 47-49; KWANG SUK KIM & MICHAEL
ROMER, GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION 35 (1979); CHARLES R. FRANK ET AL., FOREIGN TRADE
REGIMES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: SOUTH KOREA 36 (1975).
6. For the amendment history of Korea's Constitution, see Dae-Kyu Yoon, Constitutional Amendment in
Korea, 16 KOREANJ. COMP. L. 1-13 (1988).
7. For a historical description of the Korean labor laws, see Amy M. Rauenhorst, Industrial Relations in
Korea: The Backdrop to the Current Drama, 11 COMP. LABOR L.J. 317, 324 (1990); Kathleen B. O'Neill, Industrial
Relations in Korea: Will Korea Become Another Japan?, 12 COMP. LABOR L. J. 360, 385 (1991).
8. See CHANG, supra note 2, at 1.
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cant and distinguishable movement for legal change. The ability to manage the economy
and to run the industries and business firms was badly needed, and the government was
considered the most appropriate means for meeting these demands. But the government
failed to provide a legal apparatus to aggressively correct market failures.
The establishment of a new government following the military coup in 1960 was accom-
panied by a shift in policy, with the government placing top priority on achieving economic
growth and establishing an active government's role in economic activity. The government's
strong commitment to guide economic development, the nationalization of several indus-
tries, the control of all the financial and fiscal policy tools, and short- and long-term plans
all helped the government to direct economic activities.9 Following the inauguration of
President Park in 1963, intense legislative activities took place together with the making of
new and ambitious government-driven economic plans. In the early 1960s, basic substantive
laws were enacted or rewritten in the form of amendments to old laws. For instance, the
Civil Code-including the laws of contract, property, securities, tort, and domestic
relations-was enacted in 1961. Until then, Korea had borrowed the Japanese Civil Code.
A number of major economic laws were enacted or substantially amended to enable effective
enforcement and to reflect the Korea-specific legal and economic environment. For in-
stance, major labor laws were substantially amended between 1961 and 1963, and the law
to induce foreign investment was first enacted in 1960.10
The laws enacted by the 1960s were instrumental in achieving economic success. In the
early half of the 1960s, many substantive economic laws were enacted, which brought about
fundamental policy changes geared largely to supporting the export-led growth strategy.
These laws, notwithstanding their state-allocative and fairly discretionary nature," were ap-
plied in a nondiscriminatory manner, without bias towards any specific group of industries
or firms. Significant reforms in trade and exchange policy led to rapid growth, 2 which
continued uninterrupted until the early 1970s, particularly in the area of labor-intensive
exports. Many laws were enacted to institutionalize and implement industrial policies to
achieve rapid growth of exports and industries. It may, therefore, be said that legal changes
supported economic growth during the 1960s and beyond.
The 1970s witnessed a significant shift in policy, with the implementation of laws de-
signed to promote specific industries, particularly Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI)."I
This governmental policy decision related to the HCI drive was first implemented as leg-
islative activity. The government enacted several laws to promote key export-targeted in-
9. See CHANG, supra note 2, at 49-5 1.
10. See Do Kim Hwan, Legal Aspects of Foreign Investment in Korea, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L.
REV. 227, 229; Sang-Hyun Song, The Legal Framework of the US-Korea Trade Relations under Korean Law (1995),
in SANG-HYUN SONG, KOREAN LAW IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 733 (1996).
11. The author borrows this terminology from the ADB research project. The authors of the comparative
report distinguished two dimensions of the legal system, allocative and procedural. The allocaive dimension
determines whether the power to make decisions about the allocation of resources is vested in the state or is
left to the market. The procedural dimension reflects whether decisions are primarily rule-based or discre-
tionary. Each dimension is a continuum, but both are cross-cutting and combine in four ways. One may
speak of a legal system as (a) market/rule-based, (b) market/discretionary, (c) state/rule-based, or
(d) state/discretionary. See PISTOR, supra note 1, at 4-7.
12. For the import liberalization policy in the 1960s, see Kwang Suk Kim, Trade and Industrialization Policies
in Korea, in TRADE POLICY AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN TURBULENT TMES 338 (G. K. Helleiner ed., 1994).
13. See CHANG, supra note 2, at 51-54.
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dustries, thereby providing the cornerstone for a subsequent governmental push towards
an export-oriented economic policy.14 These laws were highly state-allocative and discre-
tionary and often the subject of arbitrary implementation. In many cases, government of-
ficials could arbitrarily select specific industry sectors or firms to be given government-
conferred advantages or privileges. Although these laws enabled the government to strongly
pursue an export-oriented strategic economic policy, their political and bureaucratic nature
produced several adverse side-effects in the Korean economy. For example, the concentra-
tion of investments in HCIs led the economy to neglect light industries, sacrificing their
growth potential; some of the government-led investments in HCIs turned out to be in-
efficient, leading to the subsequent realignment of investments and rationalization measures
in the 1980s; the industrial organization dominated by the chaebol was also consolidated
due to the HCI drive. In addition, during the 1970s, the government suppressed any private
activities that might hinder the export-oriented economic policy. For instance, the govern-
ment controlled the labor movement, 5 which was made possible by the labor law.'
6
The 1980s witnessed a series of new laws and policies to strengthen the functions of the
market mechanism and to cure the imperfections found in the government's management
of the economy. 7 These include trade liberalization, competition law and policy," and
deregulation and privatization of public enterprises. Major laws relating to industrial policy
promoting key industries were amended to lessen the degree of government intervention. 9
The labor laws were also amended to enhance the protection of workers' rights, which was
mandated by the new Constitution of 1980. Thus, the legal restrictions on workers' rights
and the labor movement were largely lifted, although the labor movement itself was polit-
ically suppressed. ° It is possible to think of the new government policies adopted in the
early 1980s as countervailing measures to mitigate the side-effects resulting from the pre-
vious export-oriented economic policy prevailing throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In this
sense, the role of law in the Korean economy from the 1960s to the 1980s can be sum-
marized as follows. In the 1960s, law led economic policy. This continued during the 1970s,
when the law was strengthened to further support and implement the export-oriented eco-
nomic policy. Meanwhile, the Korean economy encountered serious side-effects as a result
of this export-oriented economic policy. Accordingly, the law again took the lead in the
1980s to cure this economic disease.
14. For the description of these laws, see CHANG, spra note 2, at 24-26.
15. See Jennifer L. Porges, The Development of Korean Labor Law and the Impact of the American System, 12
COMP. LAB. L.J. 335, 351 (1991).
16. In contrast to this, during the same period, other cases reflect the positive effects that legal change had
on Korean economic growth, without expensive opportunity costs to labor groups or others. For instance, the
1973 amendment to the Foreign Capital Inducement Act significantly contributed to an increase in foreign
capital as well as foreign direct investment under very favorable conditions. This enabled Korean firms to
implement large-scale investment in key industries and consequently contributed to the economic growth of
Korea. See Song, supra note 10, at 744-46.
17. See CHANo, supra note 2, at 54-55.
18. For the first time, the Korean competition law, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, was
enacted in December 1980. For the Korean competition law and policy in general, see Seung Wha Chang,
Korea, in WORLD ANTITRUST LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPREHENSIVE MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND BUSINESSES
ch. 36 (James J. Garrett ed., 1995).
19. See CHANG, supra note 2, at 24-26.
20. See Porges, -upra note 15, at 352.
VOL. 34, NO. 1
ROLE OF LAW IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 271
By the 1990s, Korea achieved a certain degree of economic stabilization and, at this time,
attempts were made to modernize the entire Korean economic system, in an effort to reach
the level of advanced countries."' In the legal arena, it is possible to identify many legislative
activities that were undertaken to upgrade the quality of the laws.2 In terms of economic
activity, the government further deregulated and liberalized the economy and opened do-
mestic markets to foreign firms. As the economy grew more complicated, the once signifi-
cant role of the government began to decline and a market mechanism began to replace
the state. This gradual process of the market substituting for the state has taken place.
Nevertheless, the substitution process was very slow and the bureaucratic nature of the
executive branch did not substantially change. It is fair to say that the 1980s and the first
half of the 1990s comprised a period during which the traditional predominance of the
state over the market-represented by regulations, protections and supports-was actively
interacting with new forces of the market, represented by trade liberalization, competition,
deregulation, and privatization. In this connection, the nature of economic laws was still a
mixture: state/discretionary in some respects and market/rule-based in other respects.
Since the mid-1980s, liberalization was on the agenda in trade talks with Korea's major
trade partners, especially the United States. Their demand for further liberalization of
imports and investment began to affect Korea's trade and investment policies and accel-
erated market opening. It is also significant that, during this period, Korea became exposed
to pressure from abroad to initiate changes in its economic and legal regimes in order to
conform to international agreements, such as the WTO Agreement. In addition, with the
accession to the OECD in the summer of 1996, Korea took the initiative to change the
major economic laws to bring them in line with those of the other OECD countries. For
instance, intellectual property laws and the laws relating to industrial policy were further
amended to conform to Korea's obligations under the WTO Agreement.23 The law relating
to foreign investment was not an exception to this process of legal change. In the late 1980s,
all of the major labor laws were also significantly amended to enhance the level of protection
of workers' rights, and the government began taking a fairly neutral position between labor
and management.2 4
In late 1997, however, the Korean economy was abruptly hit in the middle of the eco-
nomic adjustment process that was accompanied by transitional changes in the nature and
substance of economic laws described above.
B. THE ROLE OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN KOREA'S ECONoMic DEVELOPMENT
We are then faced with the question of whether it is possible to demonstrate a positive
relationship between economic development and the increasing significance of the role of
the legal and dispute settlement systems over the past few decades. Indeed, the moderni-
zation and development of legal institutions and dispute settlement systems went hand in
21. See CHANG, supra note 2, at 55-56.
22. Seeid. at 11-33.
23. For the impact of multilateral trade negotiations on the Korean intellectual property laws, see Sang-
Hyun Song & Seong Ki Kim, The Impact of Multi-lateral Trade Negotiations on Intellectual Property Laws in Korea,
13 UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 118, 118-39 (1994), reprinted in SANG-HY N SONG, KOREAN LAW IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 1034-49 (1996).
24. See Rauenhorst, supra note 7, at 334.
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hand with economic development. Despite this parallel development, when compared with
substantive economic laws, it is not certain that the modernization of legal institutions and
the legal system, in any respect, had a direct impact on economic development. Notwith-
standing its modernization for the last several decades, it appears that the current legal and
dispute settlement system has yet to satisfy the social demand for resolving the increased
legal disputes that accompanied economic development. Having said this, the next section
reviews the evolution of Korea's dispute settlement systems from 1960 to 1996.
1. Legal Institutions and Process
The basic court system had already been established before 1960. In 1960, the Korean
courts handled all kinds of legal disputes, including civil, commercial, criminal, and ad-
ministrative cases. All courts were established within the framework of the judicial branch
of the government, which was constitutionally independent from the executive and the
legislative branches. The courts were structured in three levels: the Supreme Court, High
Courts (mostly courts of appeal) and District Courts. As far as politically insensitive cases
are concerned, the courts were regarded as fairly independent. Government expenditure
on the judiciary at that time was very low, however.s Arbitration as a means of alternative
dispute settlement was used only after the enactment of the Arbitration Act in 1966.26
Since 1960, many important changes have taken place with respect to legal institutions
and process. Most noticeably, the 1987 Constitution established a Constitutional Court for
judicial review. Because this institution was created against the background of further prog-
ress towards democratization, its caseload has increased strikingly, in terms of variety as
well as in number, and the ratio of "constitutional checks" on legislation has also been
relatively high.
Looking back on the history of the Judicial Branch, the original court structure has
remained basically unchanged. A few special courts, such as a Family Court and an Admin-
istrative Court, were newly established. There has been a marginal increase in the number
of lower courts, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1:
Number of Courts
Supreme High Divisions of the
Year Court Court District Court District Court
1962 1 3 10 (1963) N/A
1972 1 3 10 38
1974 1 3 11 n/a
1979 1 3 11 38
1981 1 4 13 40
1988 1 4 13 41
1989 1 5 14 n/a
1994 1 5 12 (since July) 44
Source: OFFICE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, SUPREME COURT OF KOREA, HISTORY OF THE COURTS (1995).
25. See CHANG, supra note 2, at 5-6.
26. See id.
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Commercial arbitration has played a more important role in recent years, but the number
of cases resolved under this nonjudicial system is only a fraction of the number of cases
brought before the court.27
2. The Legal Profession
a. Legal Education and Entry to the Bar
In 1960, Korea had a handful of colleges of law. In addition, graduation from a college
of law did not guarantee the license to practice as a lawyer. Rather, it was necessary for
applicants to pass the National Judicial Examination, which was administered by the gov-
ernment. It was not required that applicants for the examination be law school graduates
-even those without a college education were allowed to apply for the examination. The
difficulty of passing the exam, however, may be demonstrated by the fact that in 1960, only
twenty-four out of 3,416 applicants passed it. This amounts to a passing rate of 0.7 percent.
Since 1960, although the number of law schools has gradually increased, the number of
students who pass the National Judicial Exam has continued to be extremely low. One result
of limiting the number of lawyers has been a chronic shortage of judges and prosecutors,
to say nothing of lawyers." As shown in Table 2, in 1981, the authorized number of can-
didates was increased to 300, followed by a substantial increase to 500 in 1996.
Since the Judicial Research and Training Institute (JRTI) was established in 1971 as a
branch of the Supreme Court, it has provided training for those who passed the Judicial
Examination. Thus, immediately following the completion of training at the JRTI, the
graduates usually become judges, public prosecutors, or practicing lawyers, according to
their individual desires and their performance on the bar examination and at the institute.
Since 1994, there has been substantial debate as to the need (or not) to reform the judicial
system as well as legal education. These arguments have, thus far, only led to marginal
changes such as modifications in the composition of subjects for the Judicial Examination
and increases in the number of successful applicants, as shown in Table 2.
b. Judges
Recognition of the necessity for judicial reform is partly due to the lack of legal profes-
sionals, especially judges. The distribution ratio of judges to the population as of 1995 was
approximately 1:42,000.29 Table 3 represents the increase in the number of judges since
1960.
Such a low number of judges necessarily burdens individual judges with extremely heavy
caseloads and low-quality bureaucratic legal services.30 Table 4 indicates the average case-
load per year of individual judges over the past twenty years.
27. For an overview of the rules and practices of Korean commercial arbitration, see Song Kun Liew, Recent
Developments in Commercial Arbitration in the Republic of Korea: The Revised Rules of the Commercial Arbitration
Board, 4 Am. REV. INT'L ARB. 37-60 (1993), reprinted in SANG-HYuN SONG, KOREAN LAW IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 479-98 (1996).
28. See DA-Kyv YooN, LAW AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN SOUTH KOREA 113 (1990).
29. See CHANG, supra note 2, at 38.
30. See Chang Soo Yang, The Judiciary in Contemporary Society: Korea, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 303,
304-05 (1993).
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Table 2:
Judicial Examination Statistics
Year Applicant Successful Applicant Rate of Success
1960 3,416 24 0.7%
1977 4, 011 80 2.0%
1979 4,506 120 2.7%
1980 n/a 141 n/a
1981 6,173 289 21:1
1982 7,386 300 25:1
1983 8,450 300 28:1
1984 12,221 303 40:1
1985 12,449 298 42:1
1986 14,303 300 48:1
1990 15,041 298 50:1
1991 16,311 287 57:1
1992 17,131 288 59:1
1993 18,991 288 66:1
1994 19,736 290 68:1
1995 20,737 308 67:1
1996 22,771 502 45:1
1997 20,551 604 30:1
Source: DAE-KYU YOON, LAW AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN SOUTH KOREA 114-15 (1990); OFFICE OFJUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION, HISTORY OF THE COURTS (1995); and the Ministry of Government Affairs and Home Ad-
ministration.
Source: OFFICE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, HISTORY OF THE COURTS (1995).
Note: The number in parentheses is that of active judges.
c. Lawyers
The usual career path to become a practicing lawyer was for JRTI graduates to become
judges or prosecutors and serve in that capacity for several years, then to go to private
practice following their retirement from public service. With the steady number of newly
hatched lawyers each year, however, a significant number now choose their career as a
lawyer without acquiring prior practical experience as a junior judge or prosecutor, as their
predecessors had. In the late 1970s, a few law firms were established and have been pros-
perous since then. Since the early 1990s, smaller law firms joined the first runners, and the
total number of law firms has continued to increase. Further, there has been a remarkable
tendency in recent years for lawyers in private practice to be recruited as judges, although
there are still few instances of this. There have been a number of cases where, on the other
hand, judges have begun to participate in law firms after several years of public service.
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Table 4:
Caseload of Individual Judges
Year Supreme Court High Court District Court Average
1978 440.1 (16) 145.7 (75) 498.8 (413) 444.4 (504)
1979 457.0 (15) 165.9 (74) 524.1 (413) 469.0 (502)
1980 640.0 (13) 187.9 (78) 614.8 (445) 553.3 (536)
1981 514.8 (12) 221.9 (84) 769.5 (442) 678.3 (538)
1982 484.5 (13) 213.3 (96) 774.4 (463) 673.6 (572)
1983 494.8 (13) 195.8 (101) 722.0 (500) 641.3 (614)
1984 466.0(13) 171.8(111) 881.8(510) 715.8(635)
1985 496.3 (12) 165.9 (118) 891.4 (583) 697.7 (713)
1986 462.1 (13) 164.3 (124) 842.5 (643) 681.0 (780)
1987 495.3 (13) 142.8 (138) 843.0 (655) 677.1 (806)
1988 487.7 (13) 128.6 (143) 699.0 (701) 600.6 (857)
1989 425.7 (13) 136.9 (148) 653.0 (748) 565.7 (909)
1990 639.9(13) 157.9(151) 653.5 (782) 574.2 (946)
1991 837.1 (13) 182.3 (151) 679.4 (802) 603.8 (966)
1992 953.1 (13) 154.6 (164) 678.3 (832) 596.7 (1,009)
1993 1,056.9 (13) 187.6 (163) 736.8 (835) 652.4 (1,011)
1994 965.5 (13) 161.0 (166) 748.8 (885) 625.1 (1,064)
1995 921.9 (13) 151.3 (172) 808.9 (921) 627.4 (1,106)
Source: OFFICE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, HISTORY OF THE COURTS (1995, 1999).
Note: i. The caseload in the table is the average workload of a judge on litigation cases alone.
ii. The number in parentheses indicates the number of judges.
d. Judicial Independence
Judges are constitutionally assured independence from interference by any state institu-
tion, whether it be legislative, executive, or judicial. In the past, the Korean judiciary was
criticized for not employing its full autonomous power as guaranteed by the Constitution,
and being susceptible to political pressure from the executive branch." These accusations
have ceased to be valid, particularly in light of recent practice. The Court has, over the past
few years, surprised the executive by handing down bold decisions from time to time as an
assertion of judicial independence. The executive naturally took note. Personal accounts
from current judges reveal that they do not feel constrained by pressure from the executive.
The method of appointment of Justices, including the Chief Justice, has changed with
each constitutional amendment; on the whole, it has been a presidential prerogative. Again,
although executive influence may have, in the past, played a part in matters of appointment,
the reality of the last few years would suggest that it no longer has a direct impact on judicial
decisions rendered in individual cases.
The tenure of lower court judges is a fixed period of ten years. Although consecutive
terms may be served, reappointment by the Chief Justice, who has exclusive jurisdiction
over these matters, is required. Again, there has been criticism that this opens the system
to abuse. Critics have pointed to a number of cases in the past where a judge has been
refused reappointment for political reasons or has been dismissed without being told the
grounds for dismissal (although the inference has been that it was due to the fact that their
31. See YooN, supra note 28, at 136.
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decisions had displeased the executive branch). 2 Nevertheless, it must be noted again that
this is not the case today. Judges currently indicate that they do not feel any sense of
insecurity of their position, but rather feel free from pressure either from the executive or
the upper judiciary in terms of rendering individual judgments.
3. Type of Legal System and Sources of Law
The modern Korean legal system was based on the German and Japanese models by
virtue of the initial imposition of Japanese colonial power at the turn of the twentieth
century. Even after independence, this civil law system continued, and by the early 1960s,
the major fundamental codes of Korea were all in existence. Like other East Asian countries,
however, the Korean legal system in the 1960s was not free from Confucian influence. This
was evident in the laws governing domestic relations and inheritance, in particular.
The basic structure of the Korean legal system has remained within the civil law tradition.
Nonetheless, there has also been evidence of the impact of the laws of non-civil law coun-
tries. Even in the areas of private civil law, such as product liability, Korean laws and judicial
decisions have started to adopt American legal theories or principles. The strong influence
of common law can be found in legislative activities in the area of economic regulation.
The U.S. Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, for instance, directly influence the securities
laws of Korea. Korea's recent entry to the OECD also has a significant impact on laws
relating to, inter alia, the financial system, corporate governance, foreign investment, and
labor policies. Several rules (binding or nonbinding) and economic policies adopted by the
OECD are rooted in the common law soil. In this sense, the question of whether the Korean
legal system is based on the civil-law or common-law structure is of little significance, at
least regarding economic laws.
Ill. Korean Financial Crisis and Structural Adjustment
Reforms: 1997-1999
A. THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE KOREAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
In July 1997, Thailand faced devaluation of its local currency, the baht, and this phe-
nomenon spread to Indonesia in October 1997. This Asian financial crisis also adversely
affected neighboring countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia and Hong Kong. Follow-
ing the Indonesian crisis, Korea was the country most seriously hit by the financial crisis.
This Korean crisis drew much more attention from the whole world because of its economic
importance in Asia and its dramatic economic success for the last decades. The Korean won
rapidly depreciated seventy percent in value between mid-October and mid-December
1997, which was followed by the loss of two-thirds of its stock market value between August
and December." After a few weeks of initial resistance, Korea was forced to seek financial
bailout packages from international institutions on November 21, 1997. The total $57
billion packages were derived from the IMF ($21 billion), the World Bank ($10 billion),
the Asian Development Bank ($4 billion), and twelve industrialized countries (approxi-
mately $22 billion).14 When Korea sought financial assistance from the IMF and others, it
entered into agreements on restructuring programs.
32. See id. at 140.
33. See John W. Head, Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis: The Role of the IMF and the United States, 7
KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 70 (1998).
34. See id. at 73.
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There are at least two divergent views on the causes for the Asian crisis and, in particular,
the Korean crisis." The first focuses on the liquidity shortage of the Asian countries. It
points out "the vulnerability of the international financial market and the skittish behavior
of international investors and creditors as a major triggering factor in the outbreak of the
crisis. ' 36 Korea faced a sudden debt problem in mid-1997, since Korean business companies
and financial institutions relied too much on short-term foreign debts that are beyond
Korea's foreign exchange reserves. Since foreign investors were getting nervous about the
Korean market and, more generally, about the Asian market, the Korean won naturally
came under attack. This view emphasizes the balance-of-payment adjustments. According
to Martin Feldstein, what Korea needed at that time was "coordinated action by creditor
banks to restructure its short-term debts, lengthening their maturity and providing addi-
tional temporary credits to help meet the interest obligations."" The IMF could have
helped Korea by providing a temporary bridge loan and then organizing the banks into a
negotiating group.1
8
Others took a different view that focuses on "fundamental structural weakness" of Korea
as a major cause of the crisis.39 They argued that Korea needed restructuring of its relevant
economic system. The IMF took this approach. The IMF organized the $57 billion bailout
package for Korea so that Korean private companies and financial institutions could satisfy
their foreign currency obligations. In return, the IMF effectively demanded fundamental
structural reforms in the Korean economy. Korea accepted the IMF demand.
4°
B. CONDITIONALITY OF THE IMF BAILOUT PACKAGE
The regular process for using the IMF's general resources is the following. First, a mem-
ber requests use of the IMF general resources. At this request, the IMF sends a mission to
the requesting country for bilateral negotiations on the terms of the financial assistance.
According to the result of the negotiations, the requesting country submits a Letter of
Intent requesting Stand-by Arrangements. The Letter of Intent is a unilateral document
prepared by the requesting country that does not carry any contractual obligations. In the
Letter of Intent, the requesting government announces its policy understandings to resolve
the current balance-of-payment problem. The Stand-by Arrangement usually stipulates the
timetable for phased drawings and performance criteria for adjustment programs. It simply
refers to the Letter of Intent for the details of the programs. Then, the Managing Director
of the IMF Executive Board recommends consideration by the board. The Executive Board
adopts Stand-by Arrangements as its decision.4' This whole process is mandated by article
35. See YUNJONG WANG, RESTRUCTURING AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: A
KOREAN VIEW 10-12 (Korean Institute for International Economic Policy, Working Paper 99-06).
36. Id.
37. Martin Feldstein, Refocusing the IMF, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 20.
38. See id.
39. WANG, supra note 35, at 11. For a criticism of this view, see Mark Weisbrot, Globalizationfor W1bom?,
31 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 631, 653 (1998).
40. In Korea's Letter of Intent requesting IMF financial assistance, Korea accepted this view. See Letter of
Intent of the Republic of Korea (Dec. 3, 1997) (last visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/
loi/120397.htm> (stating that "[tlhe government has put in place a comprehensive policy package to address
decisively and promptly the structural weaknesses that are at the root cause of the present difficulties .... ).
41. For the description of this process in more detail, see ERIK DENTERS, LAW AND POLICY OF IMF CON-
DITIONALITY chs. 3 & 4 (1996).
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V, section 3(a) of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF
Agreement). It provides:
[t]he Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its general resources, including policies on stand-
by or similar arrangements, and may adopt special policies for special balance of payments
problems, that will assist members to solve their balance of payments problems in a manner
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement and that will establish adequate safeguards for
the temporary use of the general resources of the Fund [emphasis added]. 42
This provision was designed to assure the repayment capability of the requesting member
country. For this purpose, the IMF is required to assess the soundness of the recipient
country's proposed adjustment programs that are expected to improve its balance of pay-
ments. Stand-by Arrangements that mirror the contents of the requesting party's Letter of
Intent usually contain the so-called IMF "conditionality." The performance criteria in-
cluded in the Stand-by Arrangements derive from the policy understandings and are the
core elements of the conditionality. Any failure to meet these criteria will mean that financial
assistance is cut off or suspended. 4
3
The Executive Board adopted the IMF Guidelines on Conditionality on March 2, 1979.
Article 9 of the Guidelines provides in relevant part:
[t]he number and content of performance criteria may vary because of the diversity of problems
and institutional arrangements of members.... Performance criteria will normally be confined
to ... macroeconomic variables. ... Performance criteria may relate to other variables only in
exceptional cases when they are essential for the effectiveness of the member's program because
of their macroeconomic impact."
A review of the Korean performance criteria included under the Stand-by Arrangement
revealed that the IMF regarded the Korean situation as an "exceptional case. '41 In June
1999, the Korean government had submitted nine Letters of Intent since December 3,
1997.46 The Korean performance criteria of course included macroeconomic variables such
as credit limits, money growth rates, amount of foreign assets, balance of payment, and the
foreign exchange guidelines. 47 The criteria, however, focus more comprehensively on the
restructuring programs, targeting the structural reforms in the financial and corporate
sectors.
C. STRUCTURAL REFORMS OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY
From the beginning, the IMF and Korea agreed on four principal subjects for structural
reforms: the financial sector, corporate sector, public sector, and labor market. In addition
42. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, art. V, § 3(a), available at
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa05.htn#3 >.
43. See DENrrEas, supra note 41, at 107-09.
44. Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
45. Republic of Korea IMF Stand-By Arrangement, Summary of the Economic Program (Dec. 5, 1997)
(last visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http://www.imf.org/extemallnp/oth/korea.htm>.
46. See WANG, supra note 35, at 22.
47. See id. at 19.
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to the $3 billion Economic Recovery Loans made on December 24, 1997, the World Bank
provided Korea with $4 billion of the SAL in 1998.48 This SAL is subject to strict condi-
tionality that encompasses the above four sectors and beyond.49
The Korean financial reform efforts began by establishing a government agency charged
with consolidated supervision of the financial sector-the Financial Supervisory Commis-
sion (FSC). The Korean government gave priority to the resolution of troubled financial
institutions and, in the long run, is trying to improve the regulatory and institutional frame-
work to support the financial system. The main features of the financial reform program
include the following: resolution of weak financial institutions; adoption and application of
sound principles and processes for the use of public resources in financial sector restruc-
turing and recapitalization; enhancement of the independence and institutional capacity of
the FSC; strengthening of prudential regulations; developing the capital market through
various means; and strengthening of securities market prudential rules and self-regulated
organizations.5
The corporate sector reform followed the financial restructuring. The corporate restruc-
turing is aimed at development of market-oriented principles in this sector. Most of all, it
focuses on corporate governance. This program includes the following main elements:
effective monitoring of corporate performance to promote rights of shareholders-par-
ticularly minority shareholders-and creditors; strengthening the role of the market for
corporate control; realization of financial transparency and accountability through adopting
international accounting and auditing standards and disclosure rules; prohibiting the affil-
iates' payment guarantees; and capital structure improvements, especially targeting
chaebols.si
The Korean government also initiated a reform of state-owned corporations (SOE). The
core objective of this program is to privatize and restructure SOEs and downsize govern-
ment organizations.52 In particular, the major infrastructure sectors are to allow private
participation. The labor market reform was aimed at facilitating economic restructuring to
mitigate the social costs of the financial crisis. The major program is to enhance labor
market flexibility by legalizing layoffs and strengthening the prohibition of illegal labor
practices.
IV. The Role of Law in the Korean Economic Reforms:
1997-1999
A. AGAIN: LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR ECONOMic REFORMS
Part H1 demonstrated that the Korean government intentionally utilized legislation to
achieve its goal of economic development. In some subjects of economic laws and under
particular time periods for the development process, the law had a positive impact on eco-
48. See WANG, supra note 35, at 16-17. The first round of the SAL of $2 billion was provided on Mar. 27,
1998, and then the second $2 billion SAL was approved on Sept. 26, 1998. See id.
49. See Letter of Korea Minister of Finance and Economy to President of the World Bank: Proposed
Second Structural Adjustment Loan (Sept. 24, 1998), available from the Korean Ministry of Finance and Econ-
omy [hereinafter Korea's SAL Proposals].
50. See id. para. 5.
51. See id. paras. 6 & 7.
52. See WAN, supra note 35, at 30-31.
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nomic development, while in others, the law produced side effects only. In the process of
economic reforms made since the financial crisis, the Korean government again employed
massive legislative activities. There is a major difference between the past and the present,
however, in that the former legislative activities were basically self-initiated, whereas the
latter were implemented to meet the conditionality of the financial assistance from the IMF
and the World Bank.
For financial sector reforms, Korea's National Assembly enacted the Financial Supervi-
sory Body Act to legally authorize the FSC to perform its supervisory role in the financial
reform process. For the first year after its birth, the FSC issued more than forty regulations
to exercise its authority under the law. The Act Concerning the Structural Improvement
of the Financial Industry and the General Banking Act were amended to facilitate structural
reforms of the unhealthy financial industry and adopt international practices in prudential
regulations, as expressed in the Basle Committee's twenty-five Core Principles for Effective
Banking Supervision. The National Assembly enacted a law to enable the Korean Asset
Management Company (KAMCO) to adopt principles for the disposition of troubled as-
sets." For a capital market reform, the National Assembly made changes in the Securities
and Exchange Law.
The Commercial Code was substantially amended to facilitate corporate sector reforms.
Major elements of the amendment include the following: improve minority shareholders'
rights, including lowering the thresholds for derivative suits; require listed companies to
have a minimum number of outside directors on their boards; and impose on directors and
"shadow" directors the same liability to their companies. The National Assembly also
amended the Certified Public Accountant Law and External Audit Law to rationalize the
role of various government agencies in supervising the accounting and auditing profession
and to adopt international accounting and auditing standards and practices. The FSC's
regulations also support reform in this regard. The Foreign Investment Promotion Act
abolished old restrictions on foreign direct investment through mergers and acquisitions.
The Foreign Exchange Management Act was replaced by the Foreign Exchange Transac-
tions Act, which is aimed at further liberalization of foreign exchange transactions.
For SOE restructuring and governance reforms, the National Assembly amended the
Act Concerning Management Structure Improvement and Privatization of SOEs. At the
early stage of reform efforts, labor laws were amended to enhance labor market flexibility,
e.g., legalizing layoffs to remove undue labor market impediments to efficient corporate
restructuring. According to specific conditions under the World Bank's SAL, Korea
amended the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) to make significant
changes in substantive provisions of the law in addition to strengthening the operational
capacity of the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC). It should be noted that the leg-
islative activities summarized above are only a fraction of the legal measures taken to
implement economic reforms. During 1998 and 1999, numerous laws were enacted or
amended for that purpose.
Interestingly, most of these legislative bills were drafted by nonlawyer government offi-
cials of the executive branch. The members of the National Assembly made only marginal
modifications in the legislative bills or simply passed them. With few exceptions, lawyers
53. The title of this law is the Act Regarding Efficient Disposition of Troubled Assets of Financial Insti-
tutions and Establishment of KAMCO.
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-whether in private or public sectors-did not actively participate in this legislative pro-
cess. Most of them were indifferent to this important substantive legal reform process.
B. AN EARLY ASSESSMENT: INHERENT LIMITS OF REFORMS
As of late 1999, statistical data on Korea's economy indicate positive signs that Korea's
economic recovery process is heading in the right direction1 4 Korea's GDP grew by five
percent in 1997, and then after the financial crisis, contracted by 5.8 percent in 1998. In
the first half of 1999, it grew by 7.3 percent, and the number reached nine percent by the
end of the year. The unemployment rate, which hit a peak of 8.2 percent in February 1999,
has since fallen back to 4.5 percent. As of June 1999, Korea paid back to the IMF a total
of $4.8 billion, out of $14.2 billion, of IMF Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) loans. For
the SRF loans that were due May and June 1999, the Korean government made an early
repayment."5 Since the initial phased-in financial assistance as of December 1997, the IMF
as well as the World Bank expressed their satisfaction with the progress of restructuring
reforms in Korea. Korea's economy seems to have bottomed out, and it hopes to become
the first country to accomplish "V-shaped" recovery from the recent Asian crisis. None-
theless, the restructuring process is slow and various significant uncertainties and risks are
still facing the Korean economy. In addition, rapid legislative activities and implementing
measures to comply with conditionality of the financial packages of the IMF and the World
Bank are facing serious internal challenges. Let us take some examples demonstrating in-
herent limits of economic and legal reforms.1
6
First, the newly established FSC is now legally given full authority to play a supervisory
role in financial reforms. The FSC has, to date, played a significant role in clearing the
Korean financial markets and leading Korea's financial institutions to adopt the interna-
tional standards and practices. Its role, however, seems to be, at most, instrumental to
achieve the short-term goal. The FSC, under its authority, has ordered closing or restruc-
turing of several banks and nonbank financial institutions. It appears to contribute to sta-
bilizing the Korean financial market in the short run. Under a truly market-based economy,
however, such decisions should be made by market forces, rather than by a powerful gov-
ernment agency. The government's role should be to set the objective market-based rules
and enforce them. The FSC-enabling law does not seem to be designed to set out an
objective legal apparatus under which market-based rules govern the financial system. Since
its birth, the FSC has issued more than forty regulations and internal guidelines. Most of
54. Some macroeconomic data indicate the tremendous recovery made by Korea between 1997 and 1999.
For example, the won-dollar exchange rate stabilized from 1,964 won-dollar on December 24, 1997, to around
1,200 won-dollar by November, 1999; foreign currency reserve increased from a mere $3.9 billion on December
18, 1997, to $68.4 billion by November, 1999; and foreign debt, which stood at $67.2 billion at the end of
September 1997, turned into $400 million credit two years later, making Korea a creditor nation for the first
time since 1979, when such statistics were first gathered by the Bank of Korea. See KOREA DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTE, KDI KYONG-JE-JOEN-MANG (ECONOMY PROSPECT) 1999 (visited Mar. 31, 2000) <http://
www.kdi.re.kr/perio/fore-frame.htm>.
55. See WANG, supra note 35, at 16 n.2.
56. It is too early to predict the future of Korea's restructuring process. Furthermore, it would be more
difficult to generally assess whether and to what extent the law has, and will have, contributed to the recovery
of Korea's economy. This paper does not attempt to make such a general assessment. Rather, this section points
out inherent limits of Korea's economic and legal reforms and suggests some possible options to perfect the
ongoing economic and legal reforms.
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such regulations contain many substantive provisions whose nature is merely discretionary
and probably free from judicial review. This type of legislation could be effective to remedy
the emergency situation of the Korean economy. But it seems to be unable to serve the
long-term goal-establishing a sound financial system based upon market/rule-based legal
system.
Corporate sector reforms are also being accompanied by new legislative activities. The
Korean government again attempted to develop market-oriented principles to drive the
corporate restructuring process. The law, to some extent, facilitates the market mechanism
by enhancing transparency, accounting standards and disclosure rules for corporate entities.
Nevertheless, the same problems as under financial reforms are arising in this corporate
sector reform. The government agency, rather than the market, decides which firms must
die and which firms must take medicine. The government designated certain firms as non-
viable companies and forced them to exit promptly. Some other firms were designated by
the government as viable but financially weak companies, and thus were forced to improve
their financial structure through so-called "workout" programs.57 In addition, the corporate
law reform may face its enforcement problem. For instance, the new legislation lowered
the threshold for minority shareholders' right to bring a derivative suit. To solve a collective
action problem, for instance, it is often necessary for lawyers to take an initiative in bringing
a derivative suit. Due to the lack of lawyers and other supplementary dispute settlement
rules and procedures, 8 a very few well-qualified corporate lawyers in Korea have an incen-
tive to represent minority shareholders rather than majority shareholders or incumbent
corporate management. In addition, it is doubtful how responsive the already heavily bur-
dened judges would be in dealing with this type of complex case requiring expertise in
corporate and business matters. This example indicates that without fundamental reforms
in the legal infrastructure, including the legal profession and dispute settlement system,
economic reforms accompanied by a series of legislative actions would be poorly imple-
mented.
The public sector reform would face a different problem. Once SOEs went private,
competition law should take charge to regulate their market-restrictive behaviors in the
previously public sector that was under state control. In this connection, Korea amended
the MRFTA. This legislation was one of the conditions imposed under the SAL of the
World Bank. Korea also enacted the Act on Comprehensive Regulation of Cartels. At the
World Bank's request, the Korean government formed the Joint Public/Private Sector
Committee in the spring of 1998. To meet the World Bank's deadline, the committee had
to submit its recommendations for the amendment byJuly 1998. Due to such time pressure,
the committee did not have enough time to discuss significant changes in substantive stan-
dards of the antitrust law. Nonetheless, the legislative bill based on the recommendations
of the committee passed the legislature in December 1998. This unusual legislative process
posed several problems. First, many important substantive standards and rules for the com-
petition policy were adopted or changed without sufficient discussion and, therefore, might
contain some flaws. In addition, the KFTC during this process endeavored to strengthen
57. The FSC took charge in this regard as well. Again, in the short run, this is understandable in light of
the fact that the banks did not appropriately function at this time, and the majority shareholders of most banks
are the government itself. Even so, this pattern of governmental intervention would not seem to serve the long-
term goal-corporate restructuring on the basis of market-oriented principles and the rule-based legal system.
58. The lack of discovery procedures or a class action system are examples.
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its discretionary enforcement power beyond the constitutional limit. It would be desirable
for private rights of action to supplement, or sometimes check, the KFTC's enforcement
of the antitrust law. The substantial amendment to the law, however, did not lift statutory
restrictions on private rights of action under the MRFTA. 5 This example demonstrates
that enactment of or amendment to certain laws to implement economic reforms could be
distorted in the legislative process so as only to strengthen the enforcement power of the
executive branch.
Labor law reform is facing a most significant social resistance. After the law legalized
employee layoffs to facilitate the corporate restructuring process, labor unions have pro-
tested strongly against the management decisions to lay off workers. The labor group be-
lieved that even after the legal change, they could have a political impact on the Korean
government and nullify the new legislation. They succeeded in some sense. The Korean
government backed off, and the Ministry of Labor directed private companies to hold their
employees as much as possible. The new labor law in many respects, therefore, is in legal
limbo.
C. LACK OF REFORM IN LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE
A brief review of Korea's economic reforms accompanied by legislative activities reveals
a fundamental weakness of the whole scheme of the reform package. Although it pursued
reforms in private sectors, the Korean government-composed of the executive, judicial,
and legislative branches-did not make a fundamental legal reform in its own structure.
V. Judicial System
As shown above, the new massive legislation, as an instrument to implement the reform
policy, could not fully function without an advanced legal infrastructure, such as the legal
profession and dispute settlement system. No matter how good substantive rules and stan-
dards adopted by new legislation may be, their values would be undermined unless a legal
system supporting their enforcement follows. In this respect, Korea is in need of judicial
reform in its broad meaning. Nevertheless, the Korean government did not include this
important item in the reform package after the financial crisis. An examination of relevant
statistical data shows the Korean government's inaction in this respect.
Table 5 shows the recent increase in the number of lawsuits in Korea. In 1998, the number
of civil lawsuits almost doubled the number in 1997. This is mainly due to massive business
failures after the financial crisis and resulting legal disputes in Korea. Some of the new
legislation also contributed to providing more avenues for dispute resolution between pri-
vate parties. Nonetheless, the number of judges increased only marginally, from 1,494 to
1,564 in the same period, as shown in Table 6. No doubt, it resulted in a hyper-increase of
the already excessive workload for individual judges. Table 7 shows the recent increase in
the caseload for individual judges.
With this excessive workload for judges, no matter how independent the Korean judiciary
may be, the Korean judicial system cannot work fairly to resolve important legal disputes
59. Under the MRFTA, a private party is not allowed to bring an antitrust action against another private
party allegedly having violated the MRFTA, unless the KFTC has already found that a violation occurred and
ordered the violator to adopt a corrective measure. See Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, art. 56.1
(1998) (Korea).
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Source: OFFICE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, HISTORY OF THE COURTS (1999).
Table 7:
Caseload of Individual Judges
Year Supreme Court High Court District Court Average
1994 965.5 (13) 161.0 (166) 748.8 (885) 625.1 (1,064)
1995 921.9 (13) 151.3 (172) 808.9 (921) 627.4 (1,106)
1996 952.9 (13) 156.4 (174) 841.3 (985) 650.2 (1,172)
1997 980.4 (13) 165.7 (183) 879.6 (1,047) 625.2 (1,243)
1998 1,122.6 (13) 143.3 (180) 1,207.6 (1,038) 824.5 (1,231)
Source: OFFICE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, HISTORY OF THE COURTS (1999).
accompanying the economic reform process. Since the economic crisis, no special courts
that could deal with certain types of cases resulting from the financial crisis, have been
established. The number of courts of general jurisdiction has increased marginally (see
Table 8).
In terms of the number of lawyers, ironically, the Kim Dae-Jung government in 1998
suspended the previous plan (made in 1996 by the former government) to substantially
increase the number of successful candidates for the Judicial Examination up to 1,000 per
year and now annually produces only 700 new lawyers. Consequently, there has been
only a marginal increase in the total number of lawyers for the last few years, as shown in
Table 9.
Due to lack of sufficient lawyers having expertise in individual economic laws, the new,
fancy legislation may not be fully utilized. For instance, as noted, the minority shareholders'
rights can be effectively exercised only when well-qualified lawyers assist them. Also, except
for the Ministry of Justice, there are only a handful of lawyers within the executive branch
who serve as government officials. This is due to the lack of sufficient lawyers in Korea's
society in general. In most cases, nonlawyer government officials are drafting important
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Year Supreme Court High Court District Court District Court
1994 1 5 12 44
1997 1 5 13 43
1998 1 6 15 43
Source: OFFICE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, HISTORY OF THE COURTS (1999).
Table 9:
Number of Practicing Lawyers
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
3,079 3,188 3,364 3,521 3,887
Source: OFFICE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, HISTORY OF THE COURTS (1999).
legislative bills and, consequently, most regulatory laws tend to be discretionary by their
nature and rarely subject to judicial review.
The foregoing review of relevant data strongly suggests that the ongoing economic re-
forms should be supplemented by comprehensive reform in the judicial system.
VI. Administrative System
The Korean banks' practice of granting excessive credit for projects with limited or
uncertain returns had weakened the financial sector and was a main contributing factor to
the outbreak of the financial crisis. 60 Such loans were called "policy loans" and in many
cases, although indirectly through the banks, were driven by the Korean government's
industrial policy. In other words, the government itself contributed to distorting Korea's
financial markets by not allowing, or at least not directing, financial institutions to play
according to the market-based rules and practices. The exercise of the government's au-
thority as a financial sector supervisor should also be monitored and checked by some other
mechanism. This is due to the danger of government failure. During the financial sector
reform process, the Korean government strengthened its role as a supervisor. The creation
of the FSC is the best example. It did not, however, check how past government failure
contributed to the occurrence of the financial crisis. To correct government failure in this
sector, Korea needs to set up the legal system under which even the government-the
executive-is required to function according to the duly established and transparent rules
-laws and regulations. As noted above, for example, the FSC-related laws and regulations
provide the FSC with virtually unlimited discretionary power to exercise its own authority.
Even if the FSC performs its role effectively in the short run, it would act in accordance
with self-made guidelines rather than the rule of law. That practice, in the long run, would
60. See WANG, supra note 35, at 23.
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possibly result in another government failure. In order to avoid this result, the financial
reforms must be accompanied by legal reform that directs the executive branch to exercise
its regulatory authority in accordance with the rule of law.
To be sure, the Korean government at the beginning announced its plan to downsize the
executive branch and deregulate sectors that were previously under state control. The gov-
ernment did some of this, but it is not enough. To realize the goal of rule of law within the
government would be more important than just shrinking the government's size. Dereg-
ulation means that private companies will run their businesses according to a market/rule-
based system. In order to realize rule of law within the executive branch, there must be a
comprehensive review of all economic laws and regulations that authorize the executive to
exercise its discretionary power. Then, such laws and regulations as well as legal institutions
should be transformed to the market-allocative and rule-based legal system. During the
recent economic reform process, such a legal reform was realistically impossible and no one
seriously attempted to launch this huge task. It is partly due to the fact that the executive
branch took the initiative of the economic reforms and it had been accustomed to enjoying
its discretionary power in the past. Only the executive participated in the negotiations with
the IMF and the World Bank. Virtually all of the legislative bills to implement the economic
reform package were drafted by the executive officials under time pressure.
In summary, a serious effort to realize rule of law within the executive branch should
accompany the current economic reforms.
VII. Legislative System
The institutional strength of the legislative branch in enacting laws and regulations is
very weak and this intensifies the weakness of the Korean legal system in general. For
instance, out of 291 legislative bills that passed the National Assembly in 1998, the members
of the National Assembly proposed only 104. The executive branch proposed the remaining
187 bills.6I Even among the 104 bills, substantial portions were actually drafted by the
executive and submitted to the National Assembly through the hands of the ruling party's
core members. Realistically speaking, enhancement of the qualification of members of the
National Assembly cannot be achieved through a sudden reform. Nonetheless, in order to
restore the check and balance between the executive and the legislature, there should be
some reform within the legislature to strengthen its capacity to enact laws and regulations,
and in particular, those governing economic activities. This is also because the executive
branch itself cannot be expected to submit the legislative bills to require the executive to
function according to market/rule-based law and realize rule of law within its own branch.
VIII. Conclusion
This article closes with the following metaphor: In the early 1960s, there was a poor
farmer family whose last name was Korea. The father of Korea family, whose name is Pres-
ident, implanted a small tree in the public garden, and named it Korean Economy. The name
of the garden was Market. The Koreas wanted to grow the tree rapidly and outgrow other
old trees in the neighborhood. So, all the members of Korea family diligently took care of
61. Data available from The National Assembly of Korea, Division of Legislative Bills.
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that tree. They also wanted to harvest fruits from that tree as soon as possible. In the 1960s,
the father of Korea family applied artificial fertilizers to the Korean tree. The names of the
fertilizers were Eport-Oriented and Instrumental Law. The tree grew quickly and outgrew
some of the trees in the neighborhood by the 1970s. The shape of the Korean tree was not
well balanced, however. Only some branches, whose names are Heavy and Chemical Industry
(HCI) and Chaebols, flourished, whereas other branches, named Light Industry, Small and
Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) and Labor, did not grow very well. At the warning of a
gardener in the early 1980s that the Korean tree may fall down due to its imbalanced shape,
the Korea family applied a medicine to rebalance the shape of the tree. The name of the
medicine was Instrumental Law 11. As the height of the Korean tree grew out of the reach
of the Korean family by the mid-1980s, they realized that the Korean tree should grow by
itself in the Market garden. Then, the Korea family gradually decreased the quantity of
fertilizers and medicine for the Korean tree. Nevertheless, the sons of Korea family, whose
names are Bureaucrat and Discretion, did not cease taking care of the tree, because they
thought that they were better than sunlight and rain in growing the tree. By the mid-1990s,
the height and size of the Korean tree outgrew most of the other trees owned by families
living in a village, Developing. Nevertheless, the Korean tree was still smaller than several
trees owned by a few families living in a hill area, Developed. In the summer of 1997, a
rainstorm originating from a tropical jungle, South-East Asia, blew up the Market garden.
The Korean tree was most badly hit and almost fell down. The neighbors were worried
about the possibility that the Korean tree might fall upon other neighboring trees. The
Korea family asked a gardener, IMF, to help rebuild the Korean tree. The gardener helped
the Korea family on the condition that they agree to cut off significant portions of the tree's
branches. A couple of years later, a botanist examined why the Korean tree was most severely
damaged by the storm. He found that, in addition to the imbalanced shape of the tree, the
weak roots were the major factor contributing to the near collapse of the Korean tree. The
name of the root is Legal System. The botanist is now advising the Korea family to apply
natural nutrient to the soil at the foot of the tree. The name of the natural nutrient is
Market/Rule-based, and a more famous nickname is Rule of Law.
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